The
Honorable George W. Bush
President of the United States
The White House
Dear
Mr. President,
We
enclose herewith the report of the Sharm el-Sheikh
Fact-Finding Committee.
We
sought and received information and advice from a wide range of individuals,
organizations, and governments. However, the conclusions and recommendations
are ours alone.
We
are grateful for the support that you and your administration have provided to
the Committee.
Respectfully,
Suleyman Demirel
Thorbjoern Jagland
Warren B. Rudman
Javier Solana
George J Mitchell, Chairman
SUMMARY
OF RECOMMENDATIONS
The
Government of Israel (GOI) and the Palestinian Authority (PA) must act swiftly
and decisively to halt the violence. Their immediate objectives then should be
to rebuild confidence and resume negotiations.
During
this mission our aim has been to fulfill the mandate agreed at Sharm el-Sheikh. We value the support given our work by the
participants at the summit, and we commend the parties for their cooperation.
Our principal recommendation is that they recommit themselves to the Sharm el-Sheikh spirit and that they implement the
decisions made there in 1999 and 2000. We believe that the summit participants
will support bold action by the parties to achieve these objectives.
The
restoration of trust is essential, and the parties should take affirmative
steps to this end. Given the high level of hostility and mistrust, the timing
and sequence of these steps are obviously crucial. This can be decided only by
the parties. We urge them to begin the process of decision immediately.
Accordingly,
we recommend that steps be taken to:
END THE VIOLENCE
·
The
GOI and the PA should reaffirm their commitment to existing agreements and
undertakings and should immediately implement an unconditional cessation of
violence.
·
The
GOI and PA should immediately resume security cooperation.
REBUILD
CONFIDENCE
·
The
PA and GOI should work together to establish a meaningful "cooling off
period" and implement additional confidence building measures, some of
which were detailed in the October 2000 Sharm
el-Sheikh Statement and some of which were offered by the U.S. on January 7,
2001 in Cairo (see Recommendations section for further description).
·
The
PA and GOI should resume their efforts to identify, condemn and discourage
incitement in all its forms.
·
The
PA should make clear through concrete action to Palestinians and Israelis alike
that terrorism is reprehensible and unacceptable, and that the PA will make a
100 percent effort to prevent terrorist operations and to punish perpetrators.
This effort should include immediate steps to apprehend and incarcerate
terrorists operating within the PA's jurisdiction.
·
The
GOI should freeze all settlement activity, including the "natural
growth" of existing settlements.
·
The
GOI should ensure that the IDF adopt and enforce policies and procedures
encouraging non-lethal responses to unarmed demonstrators, with a view to
minimizing casualties and friction between the two communities.
·
The
PA should prevent gunmen from using Palestinian populated areas to fire upon
Israeli populated areas and IDF positions. This tactic places civilians on both
sides at unnecessary risk.
·
The
GOI should lift closures, transfer to the PA all tax revenues owed, and permit
Palestinians who had been employed in
·
The
PA should renew cooperation with Israeli security agencies to ensure, to the
maximum extent possible, that Palestinian workers employed within
·
The
PA and GOI should consider a joint undertaking to preserve and protect holy
places sacred to the traditions of Jews, Muslims, and Christians.
·
The
GOI and PA should jointly endorse and support the work of Palestinian and
Israeli non- governmental organizations involved in cross-community initiatives
linking the two peoples
RESUME
NEGOTIATIONS
In
the spirit of the Sharm el-Sheikh agreements and
understandings of 1999 and 2000, we recommend that the parties meet to reaffirm
their commitment to signed agreements and mutual understandings, and take
corresponding action. This should be the basis for resuming full and meaningful
negotiations.
INTRODUCTION
On
October 17, 2000, at the conclusion of the Middle East Peace Summit at Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, the President of the United States
spoke on behalf of the participants (the Government of Israel, the Palestinian
Authority, the Governments of Egypt, Jordan, and the United States, the United
Nations, and the European Union). Among other things, the President stated
that:
The United States will
develop with the Israelis and Palestinians, as well as in consultation with the
United Nations Secretary General, a committee of fact-finding on the events of
the past several weeks and how to prevent their recurrence. The committee's
report will be shared by the U.S. President with the U.N. Secretary General and
the parties prior to publication. A final report shall be submitted under the
auspices of the U.S. President for publication.1
On
November 7, 2000, following consultations with the other participants, the
President asked us to serve on what has come to be known as the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee. In a letter to us
on December 6, 2000, the President stated that:
The purpose of the Summit,
and of the agreement that ensued, was to end the violence, to prevent its
recurrence, and to find a path back to the peace process. In its actions and
mode of operation, therefore, the Committee should be guided by these
overriding goals ... The Committee should strive to steer clear of any step
that will intensify mutual blame and finger-pointing between the parties. As I
noted in my previous letter, "the Committee should not become a divisive
force or a focal point for blame and recrimination but rather should serve to
forestall violence and confrontation and provide lessons for the future."
This should not be a tribunal whose purpose is to determine the guilt or
innocence of individuals or of the parties; rather, it should be a fact-finding
committee whose purpose is to determine what happened and how to avoid it
recurring in the future.2
After
our first meeting, held before we visited the region, we urged an end to all
violence. Our meetings and our observations during our subsequent visits to the
region have intensified our convictions in this regard. Whatever the source,
violence will not solve the problems of the region. It will only make them
worse. Death and destruction will not bring peace, but will deepen the hatred
and harden the resolve on both sides. There is only one way to peace, justice,
and security in the Middle East, and that is through negotiation.
Despite
their long history and close proximity, some Israelis and Palestinians seem not
to fully appreciate each other's problems and concerns. Some Israelis appear
not to comprehend the humiliation and frustration that Palestinians must endure
every day as a result of living with the continuing effects of occupation,
sustained by the presence of Israeli military forces and settlements in their
midst, or the determination of the Palestinians to achieve independence and
genuine self-determination. Some Palestinians appear not to comprehend the
extent to which terrorism creates fear among the Israeli people and undermines
their belief in the possibility of co-existence, or the determination of the
GOI to do whatever is necessary to protect its people.
Fear,
hate, anger, and frustration have risen on both sides. The greatest danger of
all is that the culture of peace, nurtured over the previous decade, is being
shattered. In its place there is a growing sense of futility and despair, and a
growing resort to violence.
Political
leaders on both sides must act and speak decisively to reverse these dangerous
trends; they must rekindle the desire and the drive for peace. That will be
difficult. But it can be done and it must be done, for the alternative is
unacceptable and should be unthinkable.
Two
proud peoples share a land and a destiny. Their competing claims and religious
differences have led to a grinding, demoralizing, dehumanizing conflict. They
can continue in conflict or they can negotiate to find a way to live
side-by-side in peace.
There
is a record of achievement. In 1991 the first peace conference with Israelis
and Palestinians took place in Madrid to achieve peace based on UN Security
Council Resolutions 242 and 338. In 1993, the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) and Israel met in Oslo for the first face-to-face negotiations; they led
to mutual recognition and the Declaration of Principles (signed by the parties
in Washington, D.C. on September 13, 1993), which provided a road map to reach
the destination agreed in Madrid. Since then, important steps have been taken
in Cairo, in Washington, and elsewhere. Last year the parties came very close
to a permanent settlement.
So
much has been achieved. So much is at risk. If the parties are to succeed in
completing their journey to their common destination, agreed commitments must
be implemented, international law respected, and human rights protected. We
encourage them to return to negotiations, however difficult. It is the only path
to peace, justice and security.
DISCUSSION
It
is clear from their statements that the participants in the summit of last
October hoped and intended that the outbreak of violence, then less than a
month old, would soon end. The U.S. President's letters to us, asking that we
make recommendations on how to prevent a recurrence of violence, reflect that
intention.
Yet
the violence has not ended. It has worsened. Thus the overriding concern of
those in the region with whom we spoke is to end the violence and to return to
the process of shaping a sustainable peace. That is what we were told, and were
asked to address, by Israelis and Palestinians alike. It was the message
conveyed to us as well by President Mubarak of Egypt,
King Abdullah of Jordan, and UN Secretary General Annan.
Their
concern must be ours. If our report is to have effect, it must deal with the
situation that exists, which is different from that envisaged by the summit
participants. In this report, we will try to answer the questions assigned to
us by the Sharm el-Sheikh summit: What happened? Why
did it happen?
In
light of the current situation, however, we must elaborate on the third part of
our mandate: How can the recurrence of violence be prevented? The relevance and
impact of our work, in the end, will be measured by the recommendations we make
concerning the following:
WHAT
HAPPENED?
We
are not a tribunal. We complied with the request that we not determine the guilt
or innocence of individuals or of the parties. We did not have the power to
compel the testimony of witnesses or the production of documents. Most of the
information we received came from the parties and, understandably, it largely
tended to support their arguments.
In
this part of our report, we do not attempt to chronicle all of the events from
late September 2000 onward. Rather, we discuss only those that shed light on
the underlying causes of violence.
In
late September 2000, Israeli, Palestinian, and other officials received reports
that Member of the Knesset (now Prime Minister) Ariel Sharon was planning a
visit to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple
Mount in Jerusalem. Palestinian and U.S. officials urged then Prime Minister Ehud Barak to prohibit the visit.3 Mr. Barak told us that he believed the visit was intended to be
an internal political act directed against him by a political opponent, and he
declined to prohibit it.
Mr.
Sharon made the visit on September 28 accompanied by over 1,000 Israeli police
officers. Although Israelis viewed the visit in an internal political context,
Palestinians saw it as highly provocative to them. On the following day, in the
same place, a large number of unarmed Palestinian demonstrators and a large
Israeli police contingent confronted each other. According to the U.S.
Department of State, "Palestinians held large demonstrations and threw
stones at police in the vicinity of the Western Wall. Police used rubber-coated
metal bullets and live ammunition to disperse the demonstrators, killing 4
persons and injuring about 200."4 According
to the GOI, 14 Israeli policemen were injured.5
Similar
demonstrations took place over the following several days.6 Thus began
what has become known as the "Al-Aqsa Intifada" (Al-Aqsa being a
mosque at the Haram al-Sharif/Temple
Mount).
The
GOI asserts that the immediate catalyst for the violence was the breakdown of
the Camp David negotiations on July 25, 2000 and the "widespread
appreciation in the international community of Palestinian responsibility for
the impasse."7
In this view, Palestinian violence was planned by the PA leadership, and was
aimed at "provoking and incurring Palestinian casualties as a means of
regaining the diplomatic initiative."8
The
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) denies the allegation that the intifada was planned. It claims, however, that "Camp
David represented nothing less than an attempt by Israel to extend the force it
exercises on the ground to negotiations,"9 and that
"the failure of the summit, and the attempts to allocate blame on the
Palestinian side only added to the tension on the ground..."10
From
the perspective of the PLO, Israel responded to the disturbances with excessive
and illegal use of deadly force against demonstrators; behavior which, in the
PLO's view, reflected Israel's contempt for the lives and safety of
Palestinians. For Palestinians, the widely seen images of the killing of
12-year-old Muhammad al Durra in Gaza on September 30, shot as he huddled
behind his father, reinforced that perception.
From
the perspective of the GOI, the demonstrations were organized and directed by
the Palestinian leadership to create sympathy for their cause around the world
by provoking Israeli security forces to fire upon demonstrators, especially young
people. For Israelis, the lynching of two military reservists, First Sgt. Vadim Novesche and First Cpl. Yosef Avrahami, in Ramallah on October 12, reflected a deep-seated Palestinian
hatred of Israel and Jews.
What
began as a series of confrontations between Palestinian demonstrators and
Israeli security forces, which resulted in the GOI's
initial restrictions on the movement of people and goods in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip (closures), has since evolved into a wider array of violent actions
and responses. There have been exchanges of fire between built-up areas,
sniping incidents and clashes between Israeli settlers and Palestinians. There
have also been terrorist acts and Israeli reactions thereto (characterized by
the GOI as counter-terrorism), including killings, further destruction of
property and economic measures. Most recently, there have been mortar attacks
on Israeli locations and IDF ground incursions into Palestinian areas.
From
the Palestinian perspective, the decision of Israel to characterize the current
crisis as "an armed conflict short of war"11 is simply
a means "to justify its assassination policy, its collective punishment
policy, and its use of lethal force."12 From the
Israeli perspective, "The Palestinian leadership have instigated,
orchestrated and directed the violence. It has used, and continues to use,
terror and attrition as strategic tools."13
In
their submissions, the parties traded allegations about the motivation and
degree of control exercised by the other. However, we were provided with no
persuasive evidence that the Sharon visit was anything other than an internal
political act; neither were we provided with persuasive evidence that the PA
planned the uprising.
Accordingly,
we have no basis on which to conclude that there was a deliberate plan by the
PA to initiate a campaign of violence at the first opportunity; or to conclude
that there was a deliberate plan by the GOI to respond with lethal force.
However,
there is also no evidence on which to conclude that the PA made a consistent
effort to contain the demonstrations and control the violence once it began; or
that the GOI made a consistent effort to use non-lethal means to control
demonstrations of unarmed Palestinians. Amid rising anger, fear, and mistrust,
each side assumed the worst about the other and acted accordingly.
The
Sharon visit did not cause the "Al-Aqsa Intifada." But it was poorly timed and the provocative
effect should have been foreseen; indeed it was foreseen by those who urged
that the visit be prohibited. More significant were the events that followed:
the decision of the Israeli police on September 29 to use lethal means against
the Palestinian demonstrators; and the subsequent failure, as noted above, of
either party to exercise restraint.
WHY
DID IT HAPPEN?
The
roots of the current violence extend much deeper than an inconclusive summit
conference. Both sides have made clear a profound disillusionment with the
behavior of the other in failing to meet the expectations arising from the
peace process launched in Madrid in 1991 and then in Oslo in 1993. Each side
has accused the other of violating specific undertakings and undermining the
spirit of their commitment to resolving their political differences peacefully.
Divergent
Expectations: We are
struck by the divergent expectations expressed by the parties relating to the
implementation of the Oslo process. Results achieved from this process were
unthinkable less than 10 years ago. During the latest round of negotiations,
the parties were closer to a permanent settlement than ever before.
Nonetheless,
Palestinians and Israelis alike told us that the premise on which the Oslo
process is based that tackling the hard "permanent status" issues
be deferred to the end of the process has gradually come under serious
pressure. The step-by-step process agreed to by the parties was based on the
assumption that each step in the negotiating process would lead to enhanced
trust and confidence. To achieve this, each party would have to implement
agreed upon commitments and abstain from actions that would be seen by the
other as attempts to abuse the process in order to predetermine the shape of
the final outcome. If this requirement is not met, the Oslo road map cannot
successfully lead to its agreed destination. Today, each side blames the other
for having ignored this fundamental aspect, resulting in a crisis in
confidence. This problem became even more pressing with the opening of
permanent status talks.
The
GOI has placed primacy on moving toward a Permanent Status Agreement in a
nonviolent atmosphere, consistent with commitments contained in the agreements
between the parties. "Even if slower than was initially envisaged, there
has, since the start of the peace process in Madrid in 1991, been steady
progress towards the goal of a Permanent Status Agreement without the resort to
violence on a scale that has characterized recent weeks."14 The
"goal" is the Permanent Status Agreement, the terms of which must be
negotiated by the parties.
The
PLO view is that delays in the process have been the result of an Israeli
attempt to prolong and solidify the occupation. Palestinians "believed
that the Oslo process would yield an end to Israeli occupation in five
years,"15
the timeframe for the transitional period specified in the Declaration of
Principles. Instead there have been, in the PLO's view, repeated Israeli delays
culminating in the Camp David summit, where, "Israel proposed to annex
about 11.2% of the West Bank (excluding Jerusalem)..." and offered
unacceptable proposals concerning Jerusalem, security and refugees. "In
sum, Israel's proposals at Camp David provided for Israel's annexation of the
best Palestinian lands, the perpetuation of Israeli control over East
Jerusalem, a continued Israeli military presence on Palestinian territory,
Israeli control over Palestinian natural resources, airspace and borders, and
the return of fewer than 1% of refugees to their homes."16
Both
sides see the lack of full compliance with agreements reached since the opening
of the peace process as evidence of a lack of good faith. This conclusion led
to an erosion of trust even before the permanent status negotiations began.
Divergent
Perspectives: During the
last seven months, these views have hardened into divergent realities. Each
side views the other as having acted in bad faith; as having turned the
optimism of Oslo into the suffering and grief of victims and their loved ones.
In their statements and actions, each side demonstrates a perspective that
fails to recognize any truth in the perspective of the other.
The
Palestinian Perspective:
For the Palestinian side, "Madrid" and "Oslo" heralded the
prospect of a State, and guaranteed an end to the occupation and a resolution
of outstanding matters within an agreed time frame. Palestinians are genuinely
angry at the continued growth of settlements and at their daily experiences of
humiliation and disruption as a result of Israel's presence in the Palestinian
territories. Palestinians see settlers and settlements in their midst not only
as violating the spirit of the Oslo process, but also as an application of
force in the form of Israel's overwhelming military superiority, which sustains
and protects the settlements.
The
Interim Agreement provides that "the two parties view the West Bank and
Gaza as a single territorial unit, the integrity and status of which will be
preserved during the interim period." Coupled with this, the Interim
Agreement's prohibition on taking steps which may prejudice permanent status
negotiations denies Israel the right to continue its illegal expansionist
settlement policy. In addition to the Interim Agreement, customary international
law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention, prohibits Israel (as an occupying
power) from establishing settlements in occupied territory pending an end
to the conflict.17
The
PLO alleges that Israeli political leaders "have made no secret of the
fact that the Israeli interpretation of Oslo was designed to segregate the
Palestinians in non-contiguous enclaves, surrounded by Israeli
military-controlled borders, with settlements and settlement roads violating
the territories' integrity."18 According
to the PLO, "In the seven years since the [Declaration of Principles], the
settler population in the West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem and the Gaza
Strip, has doubled to 200,000, and the settler population in East Jerusalem has
risen to 170,000. Israel has constructed approximately 30 new settlements, and
expanded a number of existing ones to house these new settlers."19
The
PLO also claims that the GOI has failed to comply with other commitments such
as the further withdrawal from the West Bank and the release of Palestinian
prisoners. In addition, Palestinians expressed frustration with the impasse
over refugees and the deteriorating economic circumstances in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip.
The
Israeli Perspective:
From the GOI perspective, the expansion of settlement activity and the taking
of measures to facilitate the convenience and safety of settlers do not
prejudice the outcome of permanent status negotiations.
Israel understands that the
Palestinian side objects to the settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip. Without prejudice to the formal status of the settlements, Israel
accepts that the settlements are an outstanding issue on which there will have
to be agreement as part of any permanent status resolution between the sides.
This point was acknowledged and agreed upon in the Declaration of Principles of
13 September 1993 as well as in other agreements between the two sides. There
has in fact been a good deal of discussion on the question of settlements
between the two sides in the various negotiations toward a permanent status
agreement.20
Indeed,
Israelis point out that at the Camp David summit and during subsequent talks
the GOI offered to make significant concessions with respect to settlements in
the context of an overall agreement.
Security,
however, is the key GOI concern. The GOI maintains that the PLO has breached
its solemn commitments by continuing the use of violence in the pursuit of
political objectives. "Israel's principal concern in the peace process has
been security. This issue is of overriding importance... [S]ecurity is not something on which Israel will bargain or
compromise. The failure of the Palestinian side to comply with both the letter
and spirit of the security provisions in the various agreements has long been a
source of disturbance in Israel."21
According
to the GOI, the Palestinian failure takes several forms: institutionalized
anti-Israel, anti-Jewish incitement; the release from detention of terrorists;
the failure to control illegal weapons; and the actual conduct of violent
operations, ranging from the insertion of riflemen into demonstrations to
terrorist attacks on Israeli civilians. The GOI maintains that the PLO has
explicitly violated its renunciation of terrorism and other acts of violence,22 thereby
significantly eroding trust between the parties. The GOI perceives "a
thread, implied but nonetheless clear, that runs throughout the Palestinian
submissions. It is that Palestinian violence against Israel and Israelis is
somehow explicable, understandable, legitimate."23
END
THE VIOLENCE
For
Israelis and Palestinians alike the experience of the past several months has
been intensely personal. Through relationships of kinship, friendship,
religion, community and profession, virtually everyone in both societies has a
link to someone who has been killed or seriously injured in the recent
violence. We were touched by their stories. During our last visit to the
region, we met with the families of Palestinian and Israeli victims. These
individual accounts of grief were heart-rending and indescribably sad. Israeli
and Palestinian families used virtually the same words to describe their grief.
When
the widow of a murdered Israeli physician a man of peace whose practice
included the treatment of Arab patients tells us that it seems that
Palestinians are interested in killing Jews for the sake of killing Jews,
Palestinians should take notice. When the parents of a Palestinian child killed
while in his bed by an errant .50 caliber bullet draw similar conclusions about
the respect accorded by Israelis to Palestinian lives, Israelis need to listen.
When we see the shattered bodies of children we know it is time for adults to
stop the violence.
With
widespread violence, both sides have resorted to portrayals of the other in
hostile stereotypes. This cycle cannot be easily broken. Without considerable
determination and readiness to compromise, the rebuilding of trust will be
impossible.
Cessation
of Violence: Since 1991,
the parties have consistently committed themselves, in all their agreements, to
the path of nonviolence. They did so most recently in the two Sharm el-Sheikh summits of September 1999 and October 2000.
To stop the violence now, the PA and GOI need not "reinvent the
wheel." Rather, they should take immediate steps to end the violence,
reaffirm their mutual commitments, and resume negotiations.
Resumption
of Security Cooperation:
Palestinian security officials told us that it would take some time perhaps
several weeks - for the PA to reassert full control over armed elements
nominally under its command and to exert decisive influence over other armed
elements operating in Palestinian areas. Israeli security officials have not
disputed these assertions. What is important is that the PA make an all-out
effort to enforce a complete cessation of violence and that it be clearly seen
by the GOI as doing so. The GOI must likewise exercise a 100 percent effort to
ensure that potential friction points, where Palestinians come into contact
with armed Israelis, do not become stages for renewed hostilities.
The
collapse of security cooperation in early October reflected the belief by each
party that the other had committed itself to a violent course of action. If the
parties wish to attain the standard of 100 percent effort to prevent violence,
the immediate resumption of security cooperation is mandatory.
We
acknowledge the reluctance of the PA to be seen as facilitating the work of
Israeli security services absent an explicit political context (i.e.,
meaningful negotiations) and under the threat of Israeli settlement expansion.
Indeed, security cooperation cannot be sustained without such negotiations and
with ongoing actions seen as prejudicing the outcome of negotiations. However,
violence is much more likely to continue without security cooperation.
Moreover, without effective security cooperation, the parties will continue to
regard all acts of violence as officially sanctioned.
In
order to overcome the current deadlock, the parties should consider how best to
revitalize security cooperation. We commend current efforts to that end.
Effective cooperation depends on recreating and sustaining an atmosphere of
confidence and good personal relations. It is for the parties themselves to
undertake the main burden of day-to-day cooperation, but they should remain
open to engaging the assistance of others in facilitating that work. Such
outside assistance should be by mutual consent, should not threaten good
bilateral working arrangements, and should not act as a tribunal or interpose
between the parties. There was good security cooperation until last year that
benefited from the good offices of the U.S. (acknowledged by both sides as
useful), and was also supported indirectly by security projects and assistance
from the European Union. The role of outside assistance should be that of
creating the appropriate framework, sustaining goodwill on both sides, and
removing friction where possible. That framework must be seen to be
contributing to the safety and welfare of both communities if there is to be
acceptance by those communities of these efforts.
REBUILD
CONFIDENCE
The
historic handshake between Chairman Arafat and the late Prime Minister Rabin at
the White House in September 1993 symbolized the expectation of both parties
that the door to the peaceful resolution of differences had been opened.
Despite the current violence and mutual loss of trust, both communities have
repeatedly expressed a desire for peace. Channeling this desire into
substantive progress has proved difficult. The restoration of trust is
essential, and the parties should take affirmative steps to this end. Given the
high level of hostility and mistrust, the timing and sequence of these steps
are obviously crucial. This can be decided only by the parties. We urge them to
begin the process of decision immediately.
Terrorism: In the September 1999 Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, the parties pledged to take
action against "any threat or act of terrorism, violence or
incitement." Although all three categories of hostilities are
reprehensible, it was no accident that "terrorism" was placed at the
top of the list.
Terrorism
involves the deliberate killing and injuring of randomly selected noncombatants
for political ends. It seeks to promote a political outcome by spreading terror
and demoralization throughout a population. It is immoral and ultimately
self-defeating. We condemn it and we urge that the parties coordinate their
security efforts to eliminate it.
In
its official submissions and briefings, the GOI has accused the PA of
supporting terrorism by releasing incarcerated terrorists, by allowing PA
security personnel to abet, and in some cases to conduct terrorist operations,
and by terminating security cooperation with the GOI The PA vigorously denies
the accusations. But Israelis hold the view that the PA's leadership has made
no real effort over the past seven months to prevent anti-Israeli terrorism.
The belief is, in and of itself, a major obstacle to the rebuilding of
confidence.
We
believe that the PA has a responsibility to help rebuild confidence by making
clear to both communities that terrorism is reprehensible and unacceptable, and
by taking all measures to prevent terrorist operations and to punish
perpetrators. This effort should include immediate steps to apprehend and
incarcerate terrorists operating within the PA's jurisdiction.
Settlements: The GOI also has a responsibility to
help rebuild confidence. A cessation of Palestinian-Israeli violence will be
particularly hard to sustain unless the GOI freezes all settlement construction
activity. The GOI should also give careful consideration to whether settlements
that are focal points for substantial friction are valuable bargaining chips
for future negotiations or provocations likely to preclude the onset of
productive talks.
The
issue is, of course, controversial. Many Israelis will regard our
recommendation as a statement of the obvious, and will support it. Many will
oppose it. But settlement activities must not be allowed to undermine the
restoration of calm and the resumption of negotiations.
During
the half-century of its existence, Israel has had the strong support of the
United States. In international forums, the U.S. has at times cast the only
vote on Israel's behalf. Yet, even in such a close relationship there are some
differences. Prominent among those differences is the U.S. Government's
long-standing opposition to the GOI's policies and
practices regarding settlements. As the then-Secretary of State, James A.
Baker, III, commented on May 22, 1991:
Every time I have gone to
Israel in connection with the peace process, on each of my four trips, I have
been met with the announcement of new settlement activity. This does violate
United States policy. It's the first thing that Arabs Arab Governments, the
first thing that the Palestinians in the territories whose situation is
really quite desperate the first thing they raise when we talk to them. I
don't think there is any bigger obstacle to peace than the settlement activity
that continues not only unabated but at an enhanced pace.24
The
policy described by Secretary Baker, on behalf of the Administration of
President George H. W. Bush, has been, in essence, the policy of every American
administration over the past quarter century.25
Most
other countries, including Turkey, Norway, and those of the European Union,
have also been critical of Israeli settlement activity, in accordance with
their views that such settlements are illegal under international law and not
in compliance with previous agreements.
On
each of our two visits to the region there were Israeli announcements regarding
expansion of settlements, and it was almost always the first issue raised by
Palestinians with whom we met. During our last visit, we observed the impact of
6,400 settlers on 140,000 Palestinians in Hebron26 and 6,500
settlers on over 1,100,000 Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.27 The
GOI describes its policy as prohibiting new settlements but permitting
expansion of exiting settlements to accommodate "natural growth."
Palestinians contend that there is no distinction between "new" and
"expanded" settlements; and that, except for a brief freeze during
the tenure of Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin, there has
been a continuing, aggressive effort by Israel to increase the number and size
of settlements.
The
subject has been widely discussed within Israel. The Haaretz
English Language Edition editorial of April 10, 2001 stated:
A government which seeks to
argue that its goal is to reach a solution to the conflict with the
Palestinians through peaceful means, and is trying at this stage to bring an
end to the violence and terrorism, must announce an end to construction in the
settlements.28
The
circumstances in the region are much changed from those which existed nearly 20
years ago. Yet, President Reagan's words remain relevant: "The immediate
adoption of a settlements freeze by Israel, more than any other action, could
create the confidence needed..."
Beyond
the obvious confidence-building qualities of a settlement freeze, we note that
many of the confrontations during this conflict have occurred at points where
Palestinians, settlers, and security forces protecting the settlers, meet.
Keeping both the peace and these friction points will be very difficult.
Reducing
Tension: We were told by
both Palestinians and Israelis that emotions generated by the many recent
deaths and funerals have fueled additional confrontations, and, in effect,
maintained the cycle of violence. We cannot urge one side or the other to refrain
from demonstrations. But both sides must make clear that violent demonstrations
will not be tolerated. We can and do urge that both sides exhibit a greater
respect for human life when demonstrators confront security personnel. In
addition, a renewed effort to stop the violence might feature, for a limited
time, a "cooling off" period during which public demonstrations at or
near friction points will be discouraged in order to break the cycle of
violence. To the extent that demonstrations continue, we urge that
demonstrators and security personnel keep their distance from one another to
reduce the potential for lethal confrontation.
Actions
and Responses: Members
of the Committee staff witnessed an incident involving stone throwing in Ramallah from the perspectives, on the ground, of both
sides. The people confronting one another were mostly young men. The absence of
senior leadership on the IDF side was striking. Likewise, the absence of
responsible security and other officials counseling restraint on the
Palestinian side was obvious.
Concerning
such confrontations, the GOI takes the position that "Israel is engaged in
an armed conflict short of war. This is not a civilian disturbance or a
demonstration or a riot. It is characterized by live-fire attacks on a
significant scale [emphasis added] ... [T]he attacks are carried out by a
well-armed and organized militia..."29 Yet, the
GOI acknowledges that of some 9,000 "attacks" by Palestinians against
Israelis, "some 2,700 [about 30 percent] involved the use of automatic
weapons, rifles, hand guns, grenades, [and] explosives of other kinds."30
Thus,
for the first three months of the current uprising, most incidents did not
involve Palestinian use of firearms and explosives. BTselem
reported that, "according to IDF figures, 73 percent of the incidents
[from September 29 to December 2, 2000] did not include Palestinian gunfire. Despite
this, it was in these incidents that most of the Palestinians [were] killed and
wounded. . ."31
Altogether, nearly 500 people were killed and over 10,000 injured over the past
seven months; the overwhelming majority in both categories were Palestinian.
Many of these deaths were avoidable, as were many Israeli deaths.
Israel's
characterization of the conflict, as noted above, is overly broad, for it does
not adequately describe the variety of incidents reported since late September
2000. Moreover, by thus defining the conflict, the IDF has suspended its policy
of mandating investigations by the Department of Military Police Investigations
whenever a Palestinian in the territories dies at the hands of an IDF soldier
in an incident not involving terrorism. In the words of the GOI, "Where
Israel considers that there is reason to investigate particular incidents, it
does so, although, given the circumstances of armed conflict, it does not do so
routinely."32
We believe, however, that by abandoning the blanket "armed conflict short
of war" characterization and by re-instituting mandatory military police
investigations, the GOI could help mitigate deadly violence and help rebuild
mutual confidence. Notwithstanding the danger posed by stone-throwers, an
effort should be made to differentiate between terrorism and protests.
Controversy
has arisen between the parties over what Israel calls the "targeting of
individual enemy combatants."33 The PLO
describes these actions as "extra-judicial executions,"34 and claims
that Israel has engaged in an "assassination policy" that is "in
clear violation of Article 32 of the Fourth Geneva Convention... ."35 The GOI
states that, "whatever action Israel has taken has been taken firmly
within the bounds of the relevant and accepted principles relating to the
conduct of hostilities."36
With
respect to demonstrations, the GOI has acknowledged "that individual
instances of excessive response may have occurred. To a soldier or a unit
coming under Palestinian attack, the equation is not that of the Israeli army
versus some stone throwing Palestinian protesters. It is a personal
equation."37
We
understand this concern, particularly since rocks can maim or even kill. It is
no easy matter for a few young soldiers, confronted by large numbers of hostile
demonstrators, to make fine legal distinctions on the spot. Still, this
"personal equation" must fit within an organizational ethic; in this
case, The Ethical Code of the Israel Defense Forces, which states, in
part:
The sanctity of human life
in the eyes of the IDF servicemen will find expression in all of their actions,
in deliberate and meticulous planning, in safe and intelligent training and in
proper execution of their mission. In evaluating the risk to self and others,
they will use the appropriate standards and will exercise constant care to
limit injury to life to the extent required to accomplish the mission.38
Those
required to respect the IDF ethical code are largely draftees, as the IDF is a
conscript force. Active duty enlisted personnel, noncommissioned officers and
junior officers the categories most likely to be present at friction points
-- are young, often teenagers. Unless more senior career personnel or
reservists are stationed at friction points, no IDF personnel present in these
sensitive areas have experience to draw upon from previous violent
Israeli-Palestinian confrontations. We think it is essential, especially in the
context of restoring confidence by minimizing deadly confrontations, that the
IDF deploy more senior, experienced soldiers to these sensitive points.
There
were incidents where IDF soldiers have used lethal force, including live
ammunition and modified metal-cored rubber rounds, against unarmed
demonstrators throwing stones.39 The IDF
should adopt crowd-control tactics that minimize the potential for deaths and
casualties, withdrawing metal-cored rubber rounds from general use and using
instead rubber baton rounds without metal cores.
We
are deeply concerned about the public safety implications of exchanges of fire
between populated areas, in particular between Israeli settlements and
neighboring Palestinian villages. Palestinian gunmen have directed small arms
fire at Israeli settlements and at nearby IDF positions from within or adjacent
to civilian dwellings in Palestinian areas, thus endangering innocent, Israeli
and Palestinian civilians alike. We condemn the positioning of gunmen within or
near civilian dwellings. The IDF often responds to such gunfire with heavy
caliber weapons, sometimes resulting in deaths and injuries to innocent
Palestinians. An IDF officer told us at the Ministry of Defense on March 23,
2001 that, "When shooting comes from a building we respond, and sometimes
there are innocent people in the building." Obviously, innocent people are
injured and killed during exchanges of this nature. We urge that such
provocations cease and that the IDF exercise maximum restraint in its responses
if they do occur. Inappropriate or excessive uses of force often lead to
escalation.
We
are aware of IDF sensitivities about these subjects. More than once we were
asked: "What about Palestinian rules of engagement? What about a
Palestinian code of ethics for their military personnel?" These are valid
questions.
On
the Palestinian side there are disturbing ambiguities in the basic areas of
responsibility and accountability. The lack of control exercised by the PA over
its own security personnel and armed elements affiliated with the PA leadership
is very troubling. We urge the PA to take all necessary steps to establish a
clear and unchallenged chain of command for armed personnel operating under its
authority. We recommend that the PA institute and enforce effective standards
of conduct and accountability, both within the uniformed ranks and between the
police and the civilian political leadership to which it reports.
Incitement: In their submissions and briefings to
the Committee, both sides expressed concerns about hateful language and images
emanating from the other, citing numerous examples of hostile sectarian and
ethnic rhetoric in the Palestinian and Israeli media, in school curricula and
in statements by religious leaders, politicians and others.
We
call on the parties to renew their formal commitments to foster mutual
understanding and tolerance and to abstain from incitement and hostile
propaganda. We condemn hate language and incitement in all its forms. We
suggest that the parties be particularly cautious about using words in a manner
that suggests collective responsibility.
Economic
and Social Impact of Violence:
Further restrictions on the movement of people and goods have been imposed by
Israel on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. These closures take three forms:
those which restrict movement between the Palestinian areas and Israel; those
(including curfews) which restrict movement within the Palestinian areas; and
those which restrict movement from the Palestinian areas to foreign countries.
These measures have disrupted the lives of hundreds of thousands of
Palestinians; they have increased Palestinian unemployment to an estimated 40
percent, in part by preventing some 140,000 Palestinians from working in
Israel; and have stripped away about one-third of the Palestinian gross
domestic product. Moreover, the transfer of tax and customs duty revenues owed
to the PA by Israel has been suspended, leading to a serious fiscal crisis in
the PA.
Of
particular concern to the PA has been the destruction by Israeli security
forces and settlers of tens of thousands of olive and fruit trees and other
agricultural property. The closures have had other adverse effects, such as
preventing civilians from access to urgent medical treatment and preventing
students from attending school.
The
GOI maintains that these measures were taken in order to protect Israeli
citizens from terrorism. Palestinians characterize these measures as
"collective punishment." The GOI denies the allegation:
Israel has not taken
measures that have had an economic impact simply for the sake of taking such
measures or for reasons of harming the Palestinian economy. The measures have
been taken for reasons of security. Thus, for example, the closure of the
Palestinian territories was taken in order to prevent, or at least minimize the
risks of, terrorist attacks. ... The Palestinian leadership has made no attempt
to control this activity and bring it to an end.40
Moreover,
the GOI points out that violence in the last quarter of 2000 cost the Israeli
economy $1.2 billion (USD), and that the loss continues at a rate of
approximately $150 million (USD) per month.41
We
acknowledge Israel's security concerns. We believe, however, that the GOI
should lift closures, transfer to the PA all revenues owed, and permit
Palestinians who have been employed in Israel to return to their jobs. Closure
policies play into the hands of extremists seeking to expand their
constituencies and thereby contribute to escalation. The PA should resume
cooperation with Israeli security agencies to ensure that Palestinian workers
employed within Israel are fully vetted and free of connections to terrorists
and terrorist organizations.
International
development assistance has from the start been an integral part of the peace
process, with an aim to strengthen the socio-economic foundations for peace.
This assistance today is more important than ever. We urge the international
community to sustain the development agenda of the peace process.
Holy
Places: It is
particularly regrettable that places such as the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem,
Joseph's Tomb in Nablus, and Rachel's Tomb in
Bethlehem have been the scenes of violence, death and injury. These are places
of peace, prayer and reflection which must be accessible to all believers.
Places
deemed holy by Muslims, Jews, and Christians merit respect, protection and
preservation. Agreements previously reached by the parties regarding holy
places must be upheld. The GOI and the PA should create a joint initiative to
defuse the sectarian aspect of their political dispute by preserving and
protecting such places. Efforts to develop inter-faith dialogue should be
encouraged.
International
Force: One of the most
controversial subjects raised during our inquiry was the issue of deploying an
international force to the Palestinian areas. The PA is strongly in favor of
having such a force to protect Palestinian civilians and their property from
the IDF and from settlers. The GOI is just as adamantly opposed to an
"international protection force," believing that it would prove
unresponsive to Israeli security concerns and interfere with bilateral
negotiations to settle the conflict.
We
believe that to be effective such a force would need the support of both
parties. We note that international forces deployed in this region have been or
are in a position to fulfill their mandates and make a positive contribution
only when they were deployed with the consent of all of the parties involved.
During
our visit to Hebron, we were briefed by personnel of the Temporary
International Presence in Hebron (TIPH), a presence to which both parties have
agreed. The TIPH is charged with observing an explosive situation and writing
reports on their observations. If the parties agree, as a confidence-building
measure, to draw upon TIPH personnel to help them manage other friction points,
we hope that TIPH contributors could accommodate such a request.
Cross-Community
Initiatives: Many
described to us the near absolute loss of trust. It was all the more inspiring,
therefore, to find groups (such as the Parent's Circle and the Economic
Cooperation Foundation) dedicated to cross-community understanding in spite of
all that has happened. We commend them and their important work.
Regrettably,
most of the work of this nature has stopped during the current conflict. To
help rebuild confidence, the GOI and PA should jointly endorse and support the
work of Israeli and Palestinian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) already
involved in confidence-building through initiatives linking both sides. It is
important that the PA and GOI support cross-community organizations and
initiatives, including the provision of humanitarian assistance to Palestinian
villages by Israeli NGOs. Providing travel permits for participants is
essential. Cooperation between the humanitarian organizations and the
military/security services of the parties should be encouraged and institutionalized.
Such
programs can help build, albeit slowly, constituencies for peace among
Palestinians and Israelis and can provide safety nets during times of
turbulence. Organizations involved in this work are vital for translating good
intentions into positive actions.
RESUME
NEGOTIATIONS
Israeli
leaders do not wish to be perceived as "rewarding violence."
Palestinian leaders do not wish to be perceived as "rewarding
occupation." We appreciate the political constraints on leaders of both
sides. Nevertheless, if the cycle of violence is to be broken and the search
for peace resumed, there needs to be a new bilateral relationship incorporating
both security cooperation and negotiations.
We
cannot prescribe to the parties how best to pursue their political objectives.
Yet the construction of a new bilateral relationship solidifying and
transcending an agreed cessation of violence requires intelligent risk-taking.
It requires, in the first instance, that each party again be willing to regard
the other as a partner. Partnership, in turn, requires at this juncture
something more than was agreed in the Declaration of Principles and in
subsequent agreements. Instead of declaring the peace process to be
"dead," the parties should determine how they will conclude their common
journey along their agreed "road map," a journey which began in
Madrid and continued in spite of problems until very recently.
To
define a starting point is for the parties to decide. Both parties have stated
that they remain committed to their mutual agreements and undertakings. It is
time to explore further implementation. The parties should declare their
intention to meet on this basis, in order to resume full and meaningful
negotiations, in the spirit of their undertakings at Sharm
el-Sheikh in 1999 and 2000.
Neither
side will be able to achieve its principal objectives unilaterally or without
political risk. We know how hard it is for leaders to act especially if the
action can be characterized by political opponents as a concession without
getting something in return. The PA must as it has at previous critical
junctures take steps to reassure Israel on security matters. The GOI must
as it has in the past take steps to reassure the PA on political matters.
Israelis and Palestinians should avoid, in their own actions and attitudes,
giving extremists, common criminals and revenge seekers the final say in
defining their joint future. This will not be easy if deadly incidents occur in
spite of effective cooperation. Notwithstanding the daunting difficulties, the
very foundation of the trust required to re-establish a functioning partnership
consists of each side making such strategic reassurances to the other.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The
GOI and the PA must act swiftly and decisively to halt the violence. Their
immediate objectives then should be to rebuild confidence and resume
negotiations. What we are asking is not easy. Palestinians and Israelis not
just their leaders, but two publics at large have lost confidence in one
another. We are asking political leaders to do, for the sake of their people,
the politically difficult: to lead without knowing how many will follow.
During
this mission our aim has been to fulfill the mandate agreed at Sharm el-Sheikh. We value the support given our work by the
participants at the summit, and we commend the parties for their cooperation.
Our principal recommendation is that they recommit themselves to the Sharm el-Sheikh spirit, and that they implement the
decisions made there in 1999 and 2000. We believe that the summit participants
will support bold action by the parties to achieve these objectives.
END
THE VIOLENCE
·
The
GOI and the PA should reaffirm their commitment to existing agreements and
undertakings and should immediately implement an unconditional cessation of
violence.
Anything
less than a complete effort by both parties to end the violence will render the
effort itself ineffective, and will likely be interpreted by the other side as
evidence of hostile intent.
·
The
GOI and PA should immediately resume security cooperation.
Effective
bilateral cooperation aimed at preventing violence will encourage the
resumption of negotiations. We are particularly concerned that, absent
effective, transparent security cooperation, terrorism and other acts of violence
will continue and may be seen as officially sanctioned whether they are or not.
The parties should consider widening the scope of security cooperation to
reflect the priorities of both communities and to seek acceptance for these
efforts from those communities.
We
acknowledge the PA's position that security cooperation presents a political
difficulty absent a suitable political context, i.e., the relaxation of
stringent Israeli security measures combined with ongoing, fruitful
negotiations. We also acknowledge the PA's fear that, with security cooperation
in hand, the GOI may not be disposed to deal forthrightly with Palestinian
political concerns. We believe that security cooperation cannot long be
sustained if meaningful negotiations are unreasonably deferred, if security
measures "on the ground" are seen as hostile, or if steps are taken
that are perceived as provocative or as prejudicing the outcome of
negotiations.
REBUILD
CONFIDENCE
·
The
PA and GOI should work together to establish a meaningful "cooling off
period" and implement additional confidence building measures, some of
which were proposed in the October 2000 Sharm
el-Sheikh Statement and some of which were offered by the U.S. on January 7,
2001 in Cairo.
·
The
PA and GOI should resume their efforts to identify, condemn and discourage
incitement in all its forms.
·
The
PA should make clear through concrete action to Palestinians and Israelis alike
that terrorism is reprehensible and unacceptable, and that the PA will make a
100 percent effort to prevent terrorist operations and to punish perpetrators.
This effort should include immediate steps to apprehend and incarcerate
terrorists operating within the PA's jurisdiction.
·
The
GOI should freeze all settlement activity, including the "natural growth"
of existing settlements.
The
kind of security cooperation desired by the GOI cannot for long co-exist with
settlement activity described very recently by the European Union as causing
"great concern" and by the U.S. as "provocative."
o
The
GOI should give careful consideration to whether settlements which are focal
points for substantial friction are valuable bargaining chips for future
negotiations or provocations likely to preclude the onset of productive talks.
o
The
GOI may wish to make it clear to the PA that a future peace would pose no
threat to the territorial contiguity of a Palestinian State to be established
in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
·
The
IDF should consider withdrawing to positions held before September 28, 2000
which will reduce the number of friction points and the potential for violent
confrontations.
·
The
GOI should ensure that the IDF adopt and enforce policies and procedures
encouraging non-lethal responses to unarmed demonstrators, with a view to
minimizing casualties and friction between the two communities. The IDF should:
o
Re-institute,
as a matter of course, military police investigations into Palestinian deaths
resulting from IDF actions in the Palestinian territories in incidents not
involving terrorism. The IDF should abandon the blanket characterization of the
current uprising as "an armed conflict short of war," which fails to
discriminate between terrorism and protest.
o
Adopt
tactics of crowd-control that minimize the potential for deaths and casualties,
including the withdrawal of metal-cored rubber rounds from general use.
o
Ensure
that experienced, seasoned personnel are present for duty at all times at known
friction points.
o
Ensure
that the stated values and standard operating procedures of the IDF effectively
instill the duty of caring for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as
well as Israelis living there, consistent with The Ethical Code of The IDF.
·
The
GOI should lift closures, transfer to the PA all tax revenues owed, and permit
Palestinians who had been employed in Israel to return to their jobs; and
should ensure that security forces and settlers refrain from the destruction of
homes and roads, as well as trees and other agricultural property in
Palestinian areas. We acknowledge the GOI's position
that actions of this nature have been taken for security reasons. Nevertheless,
their economic effects will persist for years.
·
The
PA should renew cooperation with Israeli security agencies to ensure, to the
maximum extent possible, that Palestinian workers employed within Israel are
fully vetted and free of connections to organizations and individuals engaged
in terrorism.
·
The
PA should prevent gunmen from using Palestinian populated areas to fire upon
Israeli populated areas and IDF positions. This tactic places civilians on both
sides at unnecessary risk.
·
The
GOI and IDF should adopt and enforce policies and procedures designed to ensure
that the response to any gunfire emanating from Palestinian populated areas
minimizes the danger to the lives and property of Palestinian civilians,
bearing in mind that it is probably the objective of gunmen to elicit an
excessive IDF response.
·
The
GOI should take all necessary steps to prevent acts of violence by settlers.
·
The
parties should abide by the provisions of the Wye
River Agreement prohibiting illegal weapons.
·
The
PA should take all necessary steps to establish a clear and unchallenged chain
of command for armed personnel operating under its authority.
·
The
PA should institute and enforce effective standards of conduct and accountability,
both within the uniformed ranks and between the police and the civilian
political leadership to which it reports.
·
The
PA and GOI should consider a joint undertaking to preserve and protect holy
places sacred to the traditions of Muslims, Jews, and Christians. An initiative
of this nature might help to reverse a disturbing trend: the increasing use of
religious themes to encourage and justify violence.
·
The
GOI and PA should jointly endorse and support the work of Palestinian and
Israeli non-governmental organizations (NGOs) involved in cross-community
initiatives linking the two peoples. It is important that these activities,
including the provision of humanitarian aid to Palestinian villages by Israeli
NGOs, receive the full backing of both parties.
RESUME
NEGOTIATIONS
·
We
reiterate our belief that a 100 percent effort to stop the violence, an
immediate resumption of security cooperation and an exchange of confidence
building measures are all important for the resumption of negotiations. Yet none
of these steps will long be sustained absent a return to serious negotiations.
It
is not within our mandate to prescribe the venue, the basis or the agenda of
negotiations. However, in order to provide an effective political context for
practical cooperation between the parties, negotiations must not be
unreasonably deferred and they must, in our view, manifest a spirit of
compromise, reconciliation and partnership, notwithstanding the events of the
past seven months.
The
parties are at a crossroads. If they do not return to the negotiating table,
they face the prospect of fighting it out for years on end, with many of their
citizens leaving for distant shores to live their lives and raise their
children. We pray they make the right choice. That means stopping the violence
now. Israelis and Palestinians have to live, work, and prosper together.
History and geography have destined them to be neighbors. That cannot be
changed. Only when their actions are guided by this awareness will they be able
to develop the vision and reality of peace and shared prosperity.
Suleyman Demirel
9th President of the
Republic of Turkey
Thorbjoern Jagland
Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Norway
George
J. Mitchell, Chairman
Former Member and Majority Leader of the United States Senate
Warren
B. Rudman
Former Member of the
United States Senate
Javier
Solana
High Representative for
the Common Foreign and Security Policy, European Union
Notes:
1 A copy of
the statement is attached.
2 Copies of
the President's letters are attached.
3 When
informed of the planned visit, Ambassador Dennis Ross (President Clinton's
Middle East Envoy) said that he told Israeli Minister of Interior Shlomo Ben-Ami, "I can think of a lot of bad ideas,
but I can't think of a worse one." See Jane Perlez,
"US Envoy Recalls the Day Pandora's Box Wouldn't Shut," The New
York Times, January 29, 2001.
4 U.S.
Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2000 (Israel),
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, February 2001, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/nea/794.htm.
5 Government
of Israel, First Statement, 28 December 2000 (hereafter "GOI, First
Statement"), para 187. B'Tselem
(The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories)
reported that 70 police were injured. See Events on the Temple Mount - 29
September 2000: Interim Report, http://www.btselem.org/English/Publications/Full_Text/Temple_Mount_2000/Temple_Mount_2000_eng.asp.
6
Disturbances also occurred within Israel's Arab community, resulting in
thirteen deaths. These events do not fall within the mandate of this Committee
and are the subject of an official GOI inquiry.
7 GOI, First
Statement, para 118.
8 Id., para 110. According to the GOI, the Palestinian Minister of
Posts and Telecommunications declared at a rally in Lebanon in March 2001 that
the confrontation with Israel had been planned following the Camp David Summit.
See Government of Israel, Second Statement, 20 March 2001 (hereafter,
"GOI, Second Statement"), para
2. The PA provided the Committee a translation of a letter from the
Minister, dated March 12, 2001, in which the Minister denied saying that the intifada was planned, and that his statement in Lebanon was
misquoted and taken out of context. We were told by an Israeli Defense Force
(IDF) intelligence officer that while the declaration itself was not
definitive, it represented an "open-source" version of what was known
to the IDF through "other means"; knowledge and means not shared by
the IDF with the Committee.
9 Palestine
Liberation Organization, Preliminary Submission of the Palestine Liberation
Organization to the International Commission of Inquiry, December 8, 2000,
p. 10. Note: submissions to the Committee from the Palestinian side were made
by the PLO.
10
Palestine Liberation Organization, A Crisis of Faith: Second Submission of the
Palestine Liberation Organization to the Sharm
El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee, December 30,2000 (hereafter "PLO, Second
Submission"), p. 16.
11 See GOI,
First Statement, para 286.
12
Palestine Liberation Organization, Third Submission of The Palestine
Liberation Organization to the Sharm El-Sheikh
Fact-Finding Committee, April 3, 2001 (hereafter "PLO, Third
Submission"), p. 51.
13 GOI, Second
Statement, para 4.
14 GOI, First
Statement, para 19.
15 PLO, Third
Submission, p. 25.
16 Id., pp.
46-50.
17 Id., pp.
27-28.
18 PLO, Second
Submission, p. 14.
19 Id., pp.
14-15.
20 GOI,
Second Statement, para 82.
21 GOI,
First Statement, para 99.
22 GOI Second
Statement, para 19, referring to the Exchange of
Notes Between the Prime Minister of Israel and the Chairman of the PLO, 9- 10
September 1993.
23 Id., para 21.
24
Testimony before the United States House of Representatives Committee on
Appropriations, 102nd Congress, May 22, 1991.
25 On March
21, 1980, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, speaking on behalf of the Carter
Administration, stated: "U.S. policy toward the establishment of Israeli
settlements in the occupied territories is unequivocal and has long been a
matter of public record. We consider it to be contrary to international law and
an impediment to the successful conclusion of the Middle East peace
process."
On September 1, 1982, President Ronald Reagan
announced what came to be known as The Reagan Plan for the Middle East, stating
that: "[T]he immediate adoption of a settlements freeze by Israel, more
than any other action, could create the confidence needed for wider
participation in these talks. Further settlement activity is in no way
necessary for the security of Israel and only diminishes the confidence of the
Arabs that a final outcome can be freely and fairly negotiated."
On December 16, 1996, at a press conference,
President Bill Clinton stated: "It just stands to reason that anything
that preempts the outcome [of the negotiations] ... cannot be helpful in making
peace. I don't think anything should be done that would be seen as preempting
the outcome." Asked if he viewed the settlements as an obstacle to peace,
President Clinton replied, "Absolutely. Absolutely."
On April 5, 2001, a U.S. State Department
spokesman, speaking for the current administration, stated: "Continuing
settlement activity does risk inflaming an already volatile situation in the
region"; he described that activity as "provocative."
26 There
are 400 settlers in the "H2" sector of central Hebron, and 6,000 in
the Kiryat Arba settlement
on the eastern edge of the city. See "An Introduction to the City of
Hebron," published by the Temporary International Presence in Hebron, http://www.tiph.org/.
27 Central
Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2000, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/gz.html
28Ha'aretz,
English Language Edition, April 10, 2001, p. 5.
29 GOI, First
Statement, para 286.
30 Id., para 189.
31 B'Tselem, Illusions of Restraint: Human Rights
Violations During the Events in the Occupied Territories, 29 September-2
December 2000, December 2000, p. 4.
32 GOI, First
Statement, para 306. "The stated policy of
the IDF is that whenever a Palestinian in the Occupied Territories dies at the
hands of a soldier, an investigation is to be made by the Department of
Military Police Investigations (MPI), except in cases defined as 'hostile
terrorist activity.'" See B'Tselem, Illusions
of Restraint, p. 24. See also, Alex Fishman, "The Intifada,
the IDF and Investigations," Yediot Aharonot (in English, Richard Bell Press, 1996, Ltd.),
January 19, 2001.
33 GOI, Second
Statement, para 69-80.
34 PLO, Third
Submission, p. 69.
35 Id., p.
60.
36 GOI, Second
Statement, para 78.
37 GOI, First
Statement, para 305.
38 Israel
Defense Forces, The Ethical Code of the Israel Defense Forces, http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/Society_&_Culture/IDF_ethics.html.
39 See,
e.g., U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2000
(Occupied Territories), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/nea/794.htm.
See also, B'Tselem, Illusions of Restraint,
pp. 15-16, reporting on the alleged practice of separating rubber bullets into
individual rounds, as opposed to firing them properly in a bound cluster of
three. Separation increases range and lethality.
40 GOI, Second
Statement, para 92.
41 Id., para 89.